Supersession, Context-Dependence, and Historical Reparations (x-posted at TEM)

One of my main interests in political philosophy is reparations. More specifically, I am very interested in historical reparations (HR) (and not just because it is uncontroversial that reparations are due to victims of violations in the distant past). Paradigmatic cases where HR might be due are African American slavery, aboriginal atrocities, and Native American atrocities. HR are very controversial, however. One of the most famous opponents of HR is Jeremy Waldron. Waldron’s initial arguments against historical reparations is found in his (in)famous “Superseding Historic Injustice.” Waldron gives many arguments against HR, but his main argument is derived from his superseding argument. In this post, I will argue that Waldron’s conclusion does not follow from his premises.

Someone point out my stupidity (x-posted at TEM)

I am currently reading my future teacher Al Casullo’s book A Priori Justification. I am really enjoying it thus far. It is clearly written, and the arguments are impressive. However, I am very confused about a few passages. On page 22 he writes,

Most contemporary theorists agree that knowledge in general does not require justification that either provides a guarantee of truth or is indefeasible (my emphasis).

A similar passage is found on page 36, where he writes

It is generally granted that the degree of justification minimally sufficient for knowledge does not entail either truth or indefeasibility (my emphasis).

Now, I read these passages as claiming that it is generally granted that one can be justified sufficiently to know P, even if P is false. Is this an accurate reading? If it is, then I know no person who advocates such a view. Knowledge is factive. P must be true in order for one to be sufficiently justified to know P. I believe that this is held to be obviously true.

When I read the first passage, I thought that he must mean that most people agree that one’s justification can be sufficient to know P even if P could be false (this merely says that one can know contingent truths). But I cannot see how the second passage can be read that way.  What am I missing?

Kamm’s (mis)interpretation of Scanlon’s basic aggregation argument (x-posted at TEM)

I was very interested in getting F.M.M. Kamm’s new book Intricate Ethics because the second chapter in devoted to the aggregation literature I have been dealing with the last few weeks (on a somewhat tangential note, Ethics Etc. is doing a reading group on this book this summer.) On the whole, Kamm’s discussion is interesting. That’s not to say it is particularly helpful. I am quite unmoved by her own views on the subject, and she has never been the clearest writer. This post isn’t about her prose style, unfortunately. Instead, it is about her misinterpretation of part of Scanlon’s argument. This misinterpretation runs rampant throughout the literature, and I feel obligated to point it out (I actually did implicitly point it out in my last post on this topic). Kamm makes the error on page 57, where she writes,

Notice also that in Scanlon’s argument, because A’s presence is said to be dealt with if it is balanced against B’s, it turns out that in the context of A’s tying with B, it is C (and not A or B) who would ultimately have an objection in Scanlon’s contractualist system, if C did not affect the outcome. Though B would be another beneficiary of the satisfaction of C’s complaint, he could not directly complain on his own behalf…

This is a bad interpretation of the argument; moreover, it is a complete misread of Scanlon. Here is what Scanlon says on page 232 of What We Owe to Each Other:

In such a case [where you save A and let B&C die], either member of the larger group might complain that this principle did not take account of the value of saving his life, since it permits the agent to decide what to do in the very same way that it would have permitted had he not been present at all, and there was only one person in each group.

Obviously enough, this passage shows that Kamm (and others) are misreading Scanlon. However, it seems just as obvious to me that she is also misinterpreting the argument. It must be the case that B has grounds for the same reasonable rejection that C has. It would make no sense to say otherwise. When Scanlon and I say that A’s claim and B’s claim neutralize each other, this is only from the point of view of C. From the point of view of B, A’s and C’s claim neutralize each other. By ignoring this fact, it makes the contractualist argument seem more fishy; i.e., more covertly violating NAP. This is, however, an uncharitable reading of the argument.

Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part two, some solutions (X-posted at TEM)

What follows is the second part of the post that I started here. Also, parts of this post were copied from a paper I am working tentatively entitled “Contractualism, Basic Aggregation, and Varied Ills Aggregation: A Defense.”

0. We will once again start with contractualist principles (slightly revised from last time):

CW: an act, α, is wrong if some person has grounds for a reasonable rejection of a system of action guiding principles that includes [edit 5/29] any principle that allows for the performance of α.

CR: an act, β, is right if no person has grounds for a reasonable rejection of a system of action guiding principles that includes any principle that allows for the performance of β.

RR: agent x has grounds for a reasonable rejection of a principle γ if and only if γ causes agent x to “fare worse” than any other agent and there is another principle, θ, that does not require any agent to sacrifice as much as x does under γ.

IR: Only the interests of individual people can ground reasonable rejections.

1. Let me remind of you of the basic aggregation case:

BA: Imagine that you are in a boat that is slowly filling with water. Equidistant from you are two other boats. In the boat to your left is A. A’s boat is quickly filling with water. Her boat will shortly go under and she will die if you do not go to save her. In the boat to your right are B and C. Their boat is filling with water at the same pace as A’s boat. Their boat will also go under shortly, and they will both die if you don’t go save them. You only have time to save either A or B&C because of your leaky boat.

Moreover, let me remind of Scanlon’s argument for why you are obligated to save B&C and let A die:

Scanlon argues that if you were to save A both B and C would have grounds for a reasonable rejection. C could say, e.g., that you were not giving her due respect if you saved A. In other words, you would be neglecting important reasons for action that are derived from your obligations to her. Scanlon argues that this is true because if the case were different such that you had a choice between saving A or B (and C was not present), it would be permissible to save either A or B. In other words, you wouldn’t have decisive reason to save either of them. However, once C enters the picture things change. It is no longer permissible to save A because of the reasons that derive from C. You would be wronging C by saving A. Rahul Kumar puts it this way: there are two stages of deliberation. In the first stage, you can either go left or right. A and B neutralize each other; i.e., they cancel each other out. However, C ‘tips the scales’ such hat you must go right. After the decision has been made to go right, there is another decision, and that is whether you should save B along with C. Since it will not be any harder for you to save B, you ought to do it.

Henderson to Nebraska (X-posted at TEM)

I am happy to (re)announce that David Henderson has accepted the Robert R. Chambers Distinguished Professorship of Philosophy and the Moral Sciences at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He takes up the second half the chair. The first half is occupied by my new boss David Sobel.(Leiter’s announcement)

New group blog

I, along with some of my philosophy friends, have started a group blog dedicated to our research. It will cover all branches of analytic philosophy. It is called The Excluded Middle. Check it out.

Once more on “The Negative Reason Existential Fallacy”

Shyam’s comments on my previous post got me thinking about the structural differences between the * argument and the † argument with respect to cases like the leveling down case. Remember, the * argument is structured like this:

(P1*) It follows from view V that there is a reason [for X] to do A.

(P2*) But obviously there is no reason [for X] to do A.

(C*) So view V is false.

The † argument is structured like this:

(1†) It follows from view V that there is decisive reason [for X] to do A.

(2†) But obviously it is not the case that there is decisive reason [for X] to do A.

(3†) So V is false.

Schroeder claims that the * argument is a descendant of the † argument. In the case of the leveling down objection against egalitarianism, this seems to be true. This is because the † version against egalitarianism is a straw man. Viz., (1†) is false for egalitarians.

My claim in my previous post was that (2*) begs the question. Shyam argued against this by citing the fact that those who advance the * argument against egalitarianism cite the leveling down case as evidence that there is no reason to prefer set two over set one (i.e., to support (2*)). My counter claim was that the case does not support (2*), and further that the case should only lead us to reject (1†). I think that, methodologically, this is important. This is because we see † arguments all of the time, and a lot of seemingly good arguments would be undermined if the problems of the * argument were also present in the † argument. In the end, however, I think that the validity of the † argument remains intact. It is fine–indeed, it may be essential–for our intuitions to be the arbiter when it comes to (2†). In other words, as long as (1†) is true about the view in question, it is methodologically fine for us to judge the veridicality of (2†) with our intuitions about a case like the leveling down one.

However, there is a crucial shift between the † argument and the * argument. Viz., the † argument is making a claim about the balance of reasons, whereas the * argument is making a claim about the existence of individual, perhaps very weak reasons. I think that it is very implausible to think that our intuitions about a case like the leveling down case can tell us anything about the truth of the former claim. When it comes to the † argument, our intuitions can verify (2†) by making vivid other, stronger reasons. But how can the case show us that there are no reasons to prefer set two over one? I don’t think that the case is capable of this. Thus, I think that there is another reason (beside what Schroeder says) to reject the * argument.

Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: Part One, an overview of the debate (Cross-Listed at “The Excluded Middle”)

0. Let’s start by making some contractualist definitions explicit.

First, an act is wrong on contractualism if an agent can reasonably reject the inclusion of a principle allowing that act to a set of action guiding moral principles.

Second, an agent x has grounds for a reasonable rejection of a principle α if and only if α causes agent x to “fare worse” than any other agent and there is another principle, β, that does not require any agent to sacrifice as much as x does under α.

Third, Scanlon’s contractualism is committed to the individualist restriction, which states that the only reasons that can ground a reasonable rejection are reasons that particular individuals have. In other words, other considerations are not allowed to ground reasonable rejections. E.g., considerations of aggregation.

1. Next, let’s introduce the basic aggregation case:

Imagine that you are in a boat that is slowly filling with water. Equidistant from you are two other boats. In the boat to your left is A. A’s boat is quickly filling with water. Her boat will shortly go under and she will die if you do not go to save her. In the boat to your right are B and C. Their boat is filling with water at the same pace as A’s boat. Their boat will also go under shortly, and they will both die if you don’t go save them. You only have time to save either A or B&C because of your leaky boat.

Intuitively, we think that you are required to save B&C. However, it seems that, prima facie, contractualism cannot deliver this result because of the individualist restriction. That is, if we do not allow for considerations of aggregation to come into play, then it is unclear how contractualism can mandate that we save B&C.

A brief comment on Schroeder’s “The Negative Reason Existential Fallacy”

A few days ago I read Mark Schroeder’s short piece “The Negative Reason Existential Fallacy.” In it, Schroeder attacks the following type of argument (found on page 1):

(P1*) It follows from view V that there is a reason [for X] to do A.

(P2*) But obviously there is no reason [for X] to do A.

(C*) So view V is false.

Schroeder rightly claims that this type of argument is used in many different places all over philosophy. The example he expounds on is the ‘leveling down’ objection against egalitarianism. The ‘leveling down’ objection asks you to imagine two sets of two possible worlds. The first set (set 1) of worlds is comprised of world A and world B. World A contains 100 units of well-being, whereas world B contains 90 units of well-being. The second set (set 2) is comprised of worlds C and D, both of which contain 10 units of well-being. The leveling down objection moves from set 1 and set 2 to the following argument:

(P1*) It follows from egalitarianism that there is a reason to prefer set two over set one.

(P2*) Obviously there is no reason to prefer set two over set one.

(C*) So egalitarianism is false.

Schroeder claims that this argument is the descendant of a more clearly egregious form of argument. Viz., the following:

(1†) It follows from egalitarianism that we ought to prefer set two over set one.

(2†) But obviously it is not the case that we ought to prefer set two over set one.

(3†) So egalitarianism is false.

(2†) is false on substantive grounds, though, because egalitarians don’t hold that equality is the only thing that is important. Rather, they merely hold that equality is an important factor. Schroeder believes that (2*) is the problematic premise in the descendant argument as well.

His argument goes like this. First, he claims that if there are reasons of very low weight to prefer set one to set two, then pragmatically we will look at those reasons as non-existent in our deliberations. Second, he argues that there are reasons of low weight. Finally, he argues that the descendant leveling down argument is structured in such a way that takes advantage of our pragmatic disregard for low-weight reasons in a misleading way. He thus concludes that negative reason existential arguments make metaphysical claims out of pragmatic ones, and are thus fallacious.

This all seems quite true. However, it seems to be a very round-about way of simply saying that the * argument begs the question. Specifically, that (2*) begs the question. The point in contention is whether or not there are reasons to prefer equality over inequality. It is hardly an illuminating point to simply deny that there as an argument that there aren’t such reasons. But that is precisely what (2*) does. Schroeder’s is a substantive point, and a good one at that. However, whether there are low weight reasons to prefer equality is beside the point in determining the merits of the * argument. Perhaps there aren’t such reasons. Nonetheless, the * argument is still bad because it obviously begs the question. I do not know if this is the case with all of the arguments Schroeder has in mind when he refers to negative reason existential arguments. However, I would be surprised if it was not.

OPC2…

…is now under way. The first week has just begun, and just like last year it is very exciting.